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In this paper I estimate the age-wealth profile under two different identification
assumptions about age, cohort and time effects. According to the life-cycle model, the two
set of assumptions should yield similar age-wealth profiles. Using the 1984-1993 Italian
Survey of Household Income and Wealth, the estimated average annual rate of wealth
decumulation in old age is found to be between 3 and 6 percent. As in the life-cycle model,
the cohort effect increases with year of birth. However, the results uncover also
considerable population heterogeneity: the rates of wealth decumulation are much lower for
rich households and households headed by individuals with higher education.
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At the individual level the life-cycle hypothesis predicts that wealth
increases up to retirement, and declines smoothly thereafter. Life-span
uncertainty and health hazards reduce the optimal rate of wealth
decumulation during retirement but do not change the basic insight of the
model. The other assumption of the life-cycle model is that growth takes
place across generations but not over the lifetime of a single individual, so
that any increase in growth shifts the earnings profile upwards, without
affecting its shape (Modigliani, 1986; Deaton, 1995). This implies that an
increase in productivity growth redistributes resources from older to
younger generations, inducing an increase in the aggregate saving rate.
The prediction that the age-wealth profile is hump-shaped cannot be
tested with cross-sectional data, because the individuals interviewed in any
cross-section belong to different generations (cohorts) which differ in
mortality rates, preferences and, most importantly, productivity. Use of out-
of-sample information to impute cohort effects in cross-sectional data was
proposed by King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982). While ingenious, this
approach assumes that cohort effects are present in the data, and does not
provide a test of the hypothesis that the magnitude of these effects is
explained mainly by productivity growth, as assumed by the life-cycle
hypothesis, rather than by other factors.
Panel data allow age and cohort effects to be disentangled. But panel data
with information on wealth are rare; even when available, measurement
errors and sample attrition pose difficult econometric problems;
disentangling age and time effects requires additional identification
assumptions. For countries lacking panel data on wealth, repeated cross-
sectional data represent a third alternative. Also these data require strong
assumptions to identify age, cohort and time effects.
The life-cycle model suggests useful (and testable) identification
assumptions. The unique feature of the model is to make strong predictions
about the shape of the age-wealth profile as well as about the size of the
cohort effects. The elderly should run down accumulated assets (the shape
of the individual age-wealth profile is concave) and the size of the cohort
effect should depend positively on year of birth (the shift of the age-wealth
profile induced by productivity growth across generations increases with
year of birth). Only the first hypothesis concerns households behavior; the3
second emphasizes the mechanism by which productivity growth affects the
resources of successive generations. Models with infinite horizons or
altruistic bequests and buffer stocks models of saving do not have such
implications.
One possibility, then, is to assume that there is no uncertainty and to
regress wealth on a set of age and cohort indicators, dropping all time
effects.
1 Alternatively, one can assume that cohort effects in wealth and
consumption are equal. This suggests a different normalization, i.e. to
regress the wealth-consumption ratio on a set of age and unrestricted time
effects, dropping all cohort effects. Comparison of the wealth age-profiles
obtained under the two procedures provides a convenient joint test of the
validity of the life-cycle model and of the identification assumptions.
According to theoretical simulations reviewed in Section 2, the optimal
yearly rate of wealth decumulation during retirement is between 3 and 8
percent, depending on the parameter assumptions and on the types of
uncertainty posited (income, mortality or health). Section 3 reviews the
approaches to estimating the age-wealth profile offered by the literature.
The data, presented in Section 4, are drawn from the 1984-93 Italian Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
The main findings of this paper are not at variance with the life-cycle
model. Sections 5 and 6 report that the age-wealth profiles estimated using
wealth and the wealth-consumption ratio as the dependent are very similar.
The estimated average yearly rate of wealth decumulation after age 70 is
between 5 and 6 percent. The pattern and magnitude of the estimated cohort
effects are consistent with the hypothesis that they depend mainly on
productivity growth. However, we also find considerable population
heterogeneity: regressions by educational attainment of the household head
and quantile regressions indicate the absence of wealth decumulation in old
age for rich and better educated households. Section 6 summarizes the
results and their implications for the explanation of the macroeconomic
relation between saving and growth.
1 As will be seen, a slightly less restrictive approach is to assume that time effects are orthogonal to
a time trend and sum to zero (Deaton and Paxson, 1994).4
2. The determinants of the age-wealth profile
The life-cycle hypothesis posits that the main motivation for saving is to
accumulate resources do be drained down for later expenditure and in
particular during retirement. Saving should be positive for young
households and negative for the retired, so that wealth should be hump-
shaped. Only in special cases it is possible to derive explicitly the wealth
behavior from the earnings profile and optimal consumption plan implied by
the life-cycle model. The simplest case is one in which a household
(individual indexes are suppressed) belonging to generation b earns a
constant income yb  until retirement age N (so that lifetime resources are
H y N b b = ), lives T years, there is no uncertainty, the interest rate and the
rate of time preference are zero and optimal consumption is constant at
c H T b = / . Then wealth of an individual of age a increases up to retirement,
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- = 1 ,  for a=0,...,(T-N). This age-wealth profile is hump-
shaped and independent from lifetime resources:
2
b b a H a f W ) ( , = (1)
where f(.) is a concave function of age. For convenience f(a) is specified as a
function of age alone, but one should keep in mind that in more realistic
examples wealth accumulation depends also on households' preferences, the
interest rate, the life-cycle variation in household size and composition, and
the rules governing retirement. Equation (1) implies that the shape of the
wealth profile depends on age, regardless of resources, while lifetime
resources, regardless of age, set the position of the profile. Introducing a
positive real interest rate, or more realistic earnings profiles does not change
this basic implication of the model.
2 In the presence of an upward sloping earnings profile, without liquidity constraints or income
uncertainty, the standard model also predicts dissaving in the early part of the life-cycle.5
Liquidity constraints early in the life cycle and uninsurable income risk
modify the path of wealth accumulation. With imperfect markets
households will accumulate wealth before retirement at a rate that is higher
than under perfect markets. But once liquidity constraints cease to be
binding and income uncertainty is resolved because the individual retires,
selfish consumers will run down accumulated wealth faster than is predicted
by the life-cycle hypothesis with perfect markets (Caballero, 1991). Thus,
income risk and liquidity constraints increase the concavity of the f(a)
function.
Lifetime uncertainty and non-insurable health hazards, both increasing
with age, have an opposite effect on the age-wealth profile: they induce the
elderly to hold assets for precautionary purposes, thus reducing the rate of
wealth decumulation during retirement. Davies (1981) points out that in the
absence of annuity markets the elderly do not run down assets completely
unless there is zero probability of surviving any longer. Davies' analysis
further suggests that even with life uncertainty wealth must decline at some
age - depending on retirement age and the form of the utility function - and
that after this age wealth should continue to decline smoothly. Using
standard parameter assumptions, he shows that life-span uncertainty reduces
the average annual rate of wealth decumulation between ages 65 and 85
from 7 to 3 percent with respect to the standard life-cycle model.
3
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994) perform a simulation for a
representative household facing life-span, health and income uncertainty. In
the absence of all sources of uncertainty, the model predicts decumulation
rates of about 8 percent per year during retirement; when length of life is the
only source of uncertainty, the average decumulation rate slows to about 3
percent, as in Davies. When all sources of uncertainty are introduced, the
rate of wealth decumulation is about 5 percent per year.
Altruistic behavior also affects the age-wealth profile. If the primary
purpose of accumulation is to leave a bequest to one's children, households
behave as if their horizon were infinite and wealth does not decline in old
age (Barro, 1974). Even if bequests are not motivated by altruism, as in
Barro, but rather by strategic motives, by the joy of giving or by deriving
3 He assumes an isoelastic utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4, a rate of
time preferences of 0.015 and an interest rate of 0.03. When the coefficient of risk aversion is
increased to 5 the implied rate of wealth decumulation is 2.1 percent.6
utility from terminal assets, wealth decumulation is smaller than predicted
by the life-cycle model under uncertainty (Hurd, 1989). The prediction is
not as sharp when intergenerational transfers take the form of inter vivos
gifts, rather than bequests. Altruistic parents should transfer resources when
they are most needed by their heirs. For instance, if the young are liquidity
constrained they will occur around the retirement age of the donors.
Significant wealth decumulation after retirement may then reflect gifts
transferred to liquidity- constrained children, rather than selfish behavior.
In principle, almost any shape of the age-wealth profile can be made
consistent with altruism, and evidence on decumulation rates does not
provide a conclusive test for the existence and nature of the bequest motive.
However, in Italy, which is the focus of the present analysis, gifts are not a
major component of wealth. A special section of the 1991 SHIW indicates
that only 5.4 percent of households report to have ever received a sizable
gifts (in the form of real estate or financial assets) from parents or relatives,
and that gifts represent about 4 percent of households' net worth and 20
percent of total intergenerational transfers (Guiso and Jappelli, 1996). Thus,
in countries in which gifts and other inter vivos transfers do not represent a
large share of intergenerational transfers, the shape of the age-wealth profile
is a significant indicator of the importance of life-cycle and precautionary
motives for saving as compared with the bequest motive.
The shape of the age-wealth profile also has important implications for
the debate about the source of the well-established macroeconomic relation
between saving and growth. The life-cycle model derives such relation
assuming that productivity growth is generation-specific.
4 The growth-
saving link results purely from the aggregation mechanism because growth
redistributes resources towards younger cohorts (Modigliani, 1986). Note,
however, that a hump-shaped wealth profile is by no means a necessary
condition for the existence of a positive relation between growth and
aggregate saving.
5
4 When productivity-growth is individual-specific, higher expected income growth reduces
individual saving. With both types of growth, the aggregate correlation between saving and
growth is a priori ambiguous.
5 Other consumption models, such as habit persistence, predict a positive relation between
aggregate saving and growth. Neoclassical and endogenous growth models imply a link running
from growth to saving, rather than from saving to growth.7
3. What kind of data, and what kind of identification assumptions?
In order to illustrate the problems encountered in estimating the age-
wealth profile empirically, it is convenient to express generation-specific
resources as H H e b
b = 0
r , where H0 denotes resources common to all
generations, regardless of year of birth and r the growth rate of productivity
across generations, and write equation (1) in logs:
6
ln( ) ln ( ) ln( ) , W f a H b a b = + + 0 r (2)
Use of cross-sectional data to estimate (2) can be highly misleading
(Shorrocks, 1975; Mirer, 1979). The individuals interviewed in any cross-
section belong to different generations that differ in mortality rates,
preferences and institutional arrangements; and most importantly, from the
point of view of this paper, productivity differs between generations. For
instance, the productivity of an individual entering the labor force in the
fifties is much less than that of an individual born in the seventies and just
now entering the labor force. Since the elderly are considerably poorer than
the young over the lifetime, they also have lower lifetime resources and
wealth. Thus, a finding that wealth declines with age in a cross-section may
derive from the fact that older generations are less productive than younger
generations, and tells little about households' behavior. In short,  in a cross-
section one cannot identify both age and cohort effects (in year t, the
difference in wealth between a 20 and a 21 years old is equivalent to the
difference between somebody born in year t-20 and somebody born in t-21).
There are three ways to control for the presence of cohort effects: panel
data, out-of-sample information, and repeated cross-sectional data. Ideally,
the best approach is the first. Wealth panel data allow the econometrician to
measure decumulation rates of retired people of one particular cohort b
according to the length of retirement (rather than age). For instance,
Diamond and Hausman (1984), find rates of dissaving after retirement of
6 Deaton and Paxson (1997) propose the same approach to model consumption and saving profiles.8
about 5 percent per year in the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature
Men. Hurd (1987), using the Retirement History Survey, finds decumulation
rates of about 1.5 percent per year (3 percent excluding housing in the
definition of wealth) and that couples with independent children dissave
more during retirement than childless couples.
In Italy and many other countries this approach is not practicable for lack
of long panel data. The ingenious method devised by King and Dicks-
Mireaux (1982) is to construct a proxy for generation-specific resources by
estimating an earnings function and to use out-of-sample information on r
to scale the earnings of the different cohorts according to their productivity
growth rates. The (log) of the ratio of wealth to permanent income is then
regressed on a function of age and other demographic controls. This is
equivalent to assuming that cohort effects depend only on generation-
specific productivity growth. This approach has some unique advantages: it
allows to interpret the cross-sectional variation in the age-profile as the pure
age effect; by introducing permanent income as a separate regressor it
allows a straightforward test of homotheticity; by adding a measure of social
security wealth it provides an estimate of the degree of substitution between
private and pension wealth. King and Dicks-Mireaux estimates, obtained on
Canadian data, imply a rate of wealth decumulation between ages 65 and 85
of 0.7 to 1.5 percent per year. Brugiavini (1987) applied this method to 1984
Italian data and finds that the average rate of wealth decumulation during
retirement ranges from 2 to 8 percent (depending on the specification). One
limitation of this approach is that cohort effects are assumed to affect the
wealth profile, i.e. one cannot test if they depend mainly on productivity
growth, as in the life-cycle model.
The third approach, pioneered by Shorrocks (1975) and Masson (1986),
is to control for differences in productivity and preferences between
generations using a time-series of cross-sectional data.
7 Repeated cross-
sections allow the econometrician to track cohorts over time. Although the
same individual is only observed once, a sample from the same cohort is
7 Shorrocks (1975) used 60 years of estate-duty statistics, concluding that wealth is an increasing
function of age. These statistics over-represent the most affluent households. Masson (1986)
constructed cohort-adjusted age-wealth profiles using four cross-sections of French data. He
found annual rates of decumulation ranging from 0.7 percent for wealthy self-employed persons
to 3-4 percent for wage-earners.9
observed in a later survey. Empirically, one can specify a flexible functional
form for wealth:
e d b + + + + = +b a b a d b h X a g W ) ( ) ( ) ln( , (3)
where g(a) is a polynomial in age,  X is a matrix of variables that affect
households resources H0  (such as sex, region of residence and schooling)
regardless of year-of-birth, h(b) is a cohort polynomial, e an idiosyncratic
component and da b +  a set of time effects to be discussed below. In principle,
this equation allows one to estimate not only if the g(a) function is concave,
but also if the h(b) function is related to productivity growth. However,
these estimates do not come for free.
Equation (3) was derived under special assumptions and in the absence of
uncertainty. With uncertainty, macroeconomic shocks lead to revisions in
households resources, and therefore in assets accumulation. Measurement
errors can also generate disturbances to the wealth equation. To incorporate
time effects, one can add to equation (3) a set of calendar year fixed effects
da b +  (a+b=m, m+1,..., M, where m and M are the first and last available
cross-sections). The subscript highlights that the year in which each
household is sampled equals age plus year of birth. The separate effect of a,
b and a+b is therefore not identified unless one is willing to make additional
identification assumptions.
One possibility is to rule out uncertainty and measurement errors and
eliminate all year dummies. Deaton and Paxson (1994) adopt a slightly less









+ = ￿ 0, so
that the year dummies sum to zero and are orthogonal to the time trend
(a+b). This is equivalent to assuming that all trends in the data can be
interpreted as a combination of age and cohort effects and are therefore, by
definition, predictable. The time effects then reflect additive macroeconomic
shocks or the residual influence of non-systematic measurement error.
This approach is useful but restrictive. In the model with uncertainty the
impact of macroeconomic shocks on saving and wealth depends on age (for10
instance, young households should react more to a given shock than
individuals close to retirement).
8 Such interaction terms are ruled out in
equation (3). Furthermore, since wealth is equal to accumulated saving, past
macro shocks may affect wealth at time (a+b). An alternative normalization
that would allow past macro shocks to be reflected in the time effects would
be to redefine the time dummies as dm=1 for (a+b)=m, m+1,..., M; dm+1=1
for (a+b)=m+1,..., M; and so on up to dM=1 for (a+b)=M and impose the
Deaton-Paxson normalization on this different set of dummies.
9 This
alternative normalization of the time effects does not affect the fit of the
model and the age-wealth profile estimated in Sections 4 and 5.
Since equation (3) imposes a life-cycle interpretation to the data (with a
rather limited role for uncertainty), it is a useful framework to check if the
estimated age-wealth profile and the cohort effect are consistent with the
theory or violate some of its basic requirements. But another set of
identification assumptions can be used. Homothetic preferences imply that
consumption is  proportional to lifetime resources. This implies that cohort
effects in wealth are the same as in consumption, and one can subtract the
log of consumption from both sides of equation (3), drop the cohort
polynomial and regress the log of the wealth-consumption ratio on the age
polynomial and unrestricted time effects:
n d b + + + = +b a b a b a d X a s C W ) ( ) / ln( , , (4)
where s(a) is the shape of the wealth-consumption ratio. Having dropped
h(b), equation (4) allows unrestricted time dummies to affect the wealth-
consumption ratio. Comparison of equations (3) and (4) highlights
advantages and costs of the two specifications. If time effects are
constrained, as in equation (3), one can estimate cohort effects in wealth. If
time effects are left unconstrained, one must assume that cohort effects in
wealth and consumption are equal, as in equation (4), but one can test if the
unconstrained time dummies sum to zero and are orthogonal to a trend. If
8 Attanasio and Weber (1994) test this implication of the model for the UK and find that the
consumption of the young increased in anticipation of the economic boom of the late 1980s.
9 I thank the referee for pointing out this alternative normalization of the time effects.11
one augments equation (4) with cohort effects, but restricts the time effects,
one can test if the cohort effect in wealth equals that in consumption,
h(b)=0. Finally, if the life-cycle model provides a good description of the
data, so that consumption is smooth through life, the shape of the estimated
age-wealth profiles obtained under the different identification assumptions
should be similar, ie g(a)@ (a).
4. The data
The primary purpose of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income
and Wealth (SHIW) is to collect detailed data on demographics, households'
consumption, income and balance sheets (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994).
The data set used in this study includes six independent cross-sections of
Italian households (1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993), a total of
44,792 observations. Net worth is the sum of household's financial assets
and net real assets. The major weakness of the SHIW is that data on
financial wealth are not available. Scaling up the flow of financial income
allows one to impute financial wealth. Missing data for financial income are
imputed using the estimated coefficients of a regression that takes into
account the probability of non-responses. The imputation scheme, which is
described in an Appendix available upon request, does not necessarily solve
the missing value problem if the modeling of non-responses is subject to
systematic bias arising from the omission of relevant variables.
10 The
regressions presented in Sections 5 and 6 were therefore replicated dropping
observations with missing financial income; since the differences with the
full-sample coefficients are of minor importance (in particular for
decumulation rates and cohort effects, which are the main focus here), these
results are not reported for brevity.
Households headed by persons born before 1910 and after 1959 are
excluded. These exclusions are motivated by concern over two sources of
10 The Appendix also compares the SHIW measures of wealth and income with the aggregate
national accounts and describes the imputation method for financial wealth. I have also tried to
match the microeconomic data with the aggregate data blowing up the survey data by applying
separate scaling factors for real and financial assets so that aggregate values are increased to the
balanca sheet figures. The estimated age-wealth profile that I obtain is similar to the one plotted in
Figure 2.12
potential sample bias. The first arises because survival probabilities may be
positively correlated with wealth, implying that rich households are over-
represented in the oldest cohorts. This correlation implies that one may find
a low rate of decumulation after retirement simply because the poor tend to
disappear from the sample earlier than the rich. We thus drop 1,758
households born before 1910 who would be over 83 years old in 1993. Any
residual correlation between wealth and mortality and between wealth or
household headship should not seriously affect the estimates. But even if it
does, the residual presence of old households will bias the coefficients
against the life-cycle model, rather than in its favor, due to the correlation
between wealth and mortality and the finding that the poor then to
decumulate more rapidly than the rich (see below).
The second source of potential bias is a correlation between wealth and
young household heads peculiar to our sample. In Italy young working
adults with independent living arrangements tend to be wealthier than
average, because most young working adults live with their parents.
11 For
instance, in 1989 the fraction of income recipients below 30 years of age
was 19.8 percent, while the fraction of household heads in that age bracket
was a tiny 7.6 percent. Households whose head was born after 1959 (who
would be less than 24 years old in 1984) are therefore excluded (2,435
households).
Also excluded are households with missing disposable income,
disposable income or consumption less than 1 million lire or missing
information for the variables used in the estimation (146 households). Since
the dependent variable is the logarithm of net worth, we exclude households
with negative or zero wealth. The sample truncation may lead to biased
estimates of the age-wealth profile. However, Italian households borrow
very little, so the number of these households is tiny (530 observations, or
1.2 percent of the sample).
12 The final sample covers 39,939 households.
11 The reasons for such behavior includes mortgage market imperfections, which prevent young
households from borrowing, and imperfections in the rental market for housing.
12 The potential selection bias in other studies that use the logarithm of wealth as the dependent
variable is more severe. For instance, King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) exclude 18 percent of the
sample with net worth lower than $2,500.13
TABLE 1
CELL SIZE AND WEALTH STATISTICS















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1910-14 70-74 79-83 372 114.3 11.6 39.6 113.6
1915-19 65-69 74-78 426 142.0 16.9 51.6 142.5
1920-24 60-64 69-73 689 169.2 21.8 62.2 166.7
1925-29 55-59 64-68 762 196.7 26.5 76.5 199.7
1930-34 50-54 59-63 806 203.5 26.6 75.1 204.6
1935-39 45-49 54-58 892 209.7 27.0 79.9 212.6
1940-44 40-44 49-53 809 212.1 23.8 74.3 215.2
1945-49 35-39 44-48 879 172.6 17.8 61.1 173.9
1950-54 30-34 39-43 706 146.1 14.5 50.6 155.1
1955-59 25-29 34-38 629 126.9 8.7 39.2 126.8
All cohorts 25-74 34-83 738 176.4 20.6 63.9 178.4
Note: Wealth is expressed in millions of 1991 lire. The averages and percentiles in columns
(4)-(8) are computed using sample weights.
The first four columns in Table 1 report the year-of-birth intervals, the
range over which the age of each cohort is observed in 1984 and in 1993,
and the average cell size in each survey. Columns (5) to (8) display the
sample means and the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of wealth for the 10
cohorts. All cohorts hold substantial amounts of wealth: even the 25th
wealth percentile has as much as 20 million lire. The concave pattern of
wealth neither supports or contradicts the life-cycle model, because it
reflects a mixture of cohort, age and time effects. The wealth distribution is
highly skewed: average wealth is much closer to the 75th percentile than to
the median. The wealth skewness and the likely presence of influential
values suggest that OLS regressions may not adequately characterize the14














Figure 1: Mean wealth by age and cohort
 





























































Figure 1 offers fundamental insights into the process of wealth
accumulation, plotting the average wealth by age of 10 cohorts: cohort 1
includes all households whose head was born between 1955 and 1959,
cohort 2 those born between 1950 and 1954, and so on up to cohort 10,
those born between 1910 and 1914. Each cohort is observed at six different
times, one for each cross-section. The figure shows that the young and the
middle-aged do most wealth accumulation. The wealth profile is relatively
flat between age 60 and 70, and then declines for all cohorts, with the
exception of cohort 9. As will be seen in the next section, the econometric
results broadly corroborate the descriptive analysis. Common shocks also
clearly affect the data in Figure 1. For instance, several cohorts show that
wealth declines between 1984 and 1986 (the first segment of each broken
line). Either cohort or age does not account for these features of the data
(reflecting either measurement errors, macroeconomic shocks or preference
shifts). Time effects are therefore potentially important.15
5. Regressions for wealth levels
In the basic specification of Table 2 I drop the X variables from equation
(3) and regress the log of wealth on two fifth-order age and year-of-birth
polynomials and a set of restricted time dummies.
13 The results are most
clearly illustrated by plotting the implied age-wealth profile in Figure 2. In
order to highlight the importance of controlling for cohort effects, I also plot
the profile obtained by a regression that treats all observations in the six
cross-sections as a large sample (i.e. dropping the time dummies and the
cohort polynomial). The cross-sectional profile shows the typical humped
shape predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis: wealth peaks at age 55 and
declines steadily thereafter. At age 80 wealth has the same level as for the
30-years old. However, cohort effects contaminate this shape. In fact, the
cohort-adjusted profile peaks about 10 years later than the cross-sectional
profile. The decumulation of wealth during retirement is less but still
substantial.
The effect of the cohort-polynomial is plotted against year-of-birth in
Figure 3. Recall that the shape of the age-wealth profile (the age
polynomial) is constrained to be the same for all generations, which thus
differ only in the level of the profile. On average, wealth grows by 3.43
percent per year for the generations born between 1910 and 1950. The
cohort effect then declines for generations born after 1950, possibly
reflecting the post-1973 slowdown in productivity (2.24 percent per year).
14
13 Results using age or cohort dummies are similar to those obtained with the age and cohort
polynomial. Furthermore, the age profile in regressions with interacted time and age dummies do
not differ much from those displayed in Table 2 and are not reported.
14 It is hard to reconcile the pattern of the cohort effect with preference-based explanations. For
instance, suppose that the shape in Figure 3 arises from different rate of time preferences or
attitudes towards bequests. For this to be true, however, younger generations should be much
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R2 0.050 0.184 0.051 0.114
Implied pattern of wealth accumulation
25 < age < 40 9.09 10.46 5.63 5.77
40 < age < 60 5.19 7.76 2.30 3.28
60 < age < 70 0.08 3.75 -0.37 1.31
70 < age < 83 -4.43 -2.81 -6.84 -6.34
Notes: The standard errors reported in parenthesis are computed using White's
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. Regressions (1) and (2) also
include a fifth-order polynomial in year-of-birth and a set of time dummies, constrained to
sum to zero and to be orthogonal to a time trend. Regressions (3) and (4) also include a set
of unrestricted time dummies. Excluded attributes in columns (2) and (4) are: households
headed by a male, households living in the Centre, households whose head is not self-





















Figure 2: Age-wealth profile
Age
 Cross-sectional profile  Cohort-adjusted profile









Figure 3: Cohort effect
Year of birth
 Effect of year-of-birth  Effect of productivity growth






It is useful to compare the estimated cohort effect with an out-of-sample
index of productivity growth. As in Alessie, Lusardi and Kapteyn (1996), I
replace the cohort-polynomial with an index of generation-specific
productivity growth in the wealth regression and plot the effect of
productivity growth in Figure 3 (the coefficient of productivity growth is
0.76 with a standard error of 0.059, the age profile is unaffected).
15 The high
correlation coefficient between the two lines in Figure 3 (0.98) is highly
suggestive of the hypothesis that the amplitude of the cohort effect is
explained mainly by productivity growth, rather than by preferences or
attitudes towards bequests.
16 If one adds the index of productivity growth to
the regression, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the cohort-polynomial
are jointly yields an F-test statistic of 2.59, which is statistically different
from zero at the 5 percent level (but not at the 1 percent level). This should
perhaps not be surprising given the flexible parametrization of the effect of
year-of-birth and the rough index used to measure the growth in generation-
specific resources.
In column (2) of Table 2 I add to the basic specification a set of
demographic variables to control for the determinants of households'
resources: sex of the household head, two regional dummies, a dummy for
self-employment, and schooling measured in years. Even though these
variables are meant to measure H0, inspection of the data suggests that each
of these variables varies over the life cycle, and cohort effects (particularly
education) also effect some of them. For instance, “female head” increases
in old age, given the longer life expectancy for women; “self-employed”
declines sharply after retirement, due to the lower participation rate of the
elderly; the “North” dummy is higher at younger ages, owing to the positive
correlation between age, wealth and headship discussed in Section 3; for
“South” the opposite is true.
It is therefore difficult to identify the pure age-wealth profile in the
augmented regressions because the age effect is now captured not only by
15 Each generation is assumed to enter the labor market at age 25 (for instance, individuals born in
1959 are assumed to enter the labor market in 1984). Average productivity growth is estimated on
the basis of a 9-year moving average of per capita GDP (highly volatile and non reliable data for
1944-46 are excluded). The source for GDP is Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo (1992).
16 In the stylized version of the life-cycle model predictable variations in generation-specific
productivity growth are the only sources of variation in the cohort effect.19
the age polynomial but also by some of the additional control variables.
17
On the other hand, these variables may help correcting for systematic
sample bias. For instance, if wealth and mortality are correlated, education,
which might be correlated with both, can attenuate the bias arising from the
changing composition of the sample (Attanasio, 1994).
Column (2) of Table 2 reports the results of the augmented specification.
Residence in the South and less schooling signal lower permanent income
and reduce considerably asset accumulation.
18 The dummy for self-
employment is large and positive. To the extent that self-employment
proxies for income volatility, the results confirm the theoretical work of
Caballero (1991) showing that the age-wealth profile shifts upwards in the
presence of uninsurable income risk.
Both the unadjusted and the cohort-adjusted age profiles plotted in Figure
4 show less wealth decumulation in old age than the profiles in Figure 2.
The demographic variables affect the size but not the general pattern of the
cohort polynomial, which again indicates that the log of wealth increases
almost linearly with year of birth.
So far I constrain the age-wealth profile to be the same for all population
groups. I thus divide the sample according to the educational attainment of
the head, a good proxy for initial resources. Since the earnings profile,
family composition, retirement age or social security replacement rates
differ across education groups, the age-wealth profiles may also differ.
However, it is still an implication of the theory that there should be wealth
decumulation in old age for each education group.
17 This problem is even more serious for family-related variables - such as number of children or
number of adults, both hump-shaped over the life-cycle - which are therefore omitted from the
estimation. The coefficients of the variable “number of adults” is positive and significant if the
variable is included in the estimation. As expected, the estimated age profile is flatter; however,
the decumulation rates during retirement are not affected. Instead, the coefficient of the variable
“number of children” is not significantly different from zero.




















Figure 4: Demographic controls
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For brevity, I do not report the estimated coefficients and plot in Figure 5
the three cohort-adjusted age-wealth profiles. The profiles of households
with elementary education or junior high school (8 years of schooling or
less) and high school education (9 to 13 years) are similar to the full sample
estimates. These groups represent the bulk of the population (70 percent and
22 percent, respectively). However households with college education (more
than 13 years, representing approximately 8 percent of the population) do
not exhibit any tendency to decumulate wealth after retirement.
19
There are several possible explanations for the different pattern of wealth
accumulation of the college-educated, not mutually exclusive. The rate of
time preference of the college-educated may be lower than that of the non-
college-educated. Non-homothetic utility functions with consumption floors
also predict that wealth is an increasing function of lifetime earnings.
Another possibility is that everyone has the same concern for their heirs'
consumption but that the bequest motive is not operative for the poor. Since
negative bequests are not allowed, poor households may choose a corner
19 Including demographic variables does not change the general picture.21
solution for bequests. Flemming (1979) shows that if earning power
regresses towards the mean, those with high wealth relative to earning
power and those at the top of the ability range will plan to leave larger
bequests. And even if earnings are positively correlated across generations,
the better educated should receive greater bequests, also inducing skewness
in the wealth distribution. Given the reduced form of the estimates, and the
lack of information on the resources or ability of the potential heirs, it is not




















Figure 5: Age-wealth profiles by education
Age
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I next explore other dimensions of the conditional distribution of wealth
by quantile regressions. The age-wealth profiles implied by the 25th, 50th
and 75th quantile regressions are displayed in Figure 6. The figure suggests
considerable heterogeneity in the data. For the bottom and medium part of
the wealth distribution (up to the 75th quantile) there is substantial
decumulation in old age. Wealthy households, however, do not seem to
conform to the model: the wealth profile shows no tendency to decline with
age after retirement for the 75th wealth percentile. These results are in
agreement with those by educational groups, because of the positive
correlation between schooling and the level of wealth. For instance, average
wealth in the group with medium education (8 to 13 years) is 205 million
lire, a value that is between the 75th and 90th wealth percentile; in the group22





















Figure 6: Quantile regressions
Age
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6.  Regressions for the wealth-consumption ratio
Table 2 also reports the coefficients of the regressions that use the
logarithm of the ratio between wealth and total consumption expenditure as
the dependent variable (equation 4).
20 As in the previous section, I report the
coefficients of the basic model (column 3), and of the model augmented by
demographic variables (column 4). Each regression contains a full set of
unrestricted time dummies. Figure 7 plots the growth rates of wealth
implied by the age effects estimated in Table 2 (results using the augmented
20 In principle, one should use the sum of non-durable consumption and the consumption of the
durable stock. However, the latter is not available in 1986.23
specification are similar). Since in old age wealth declines at a much larger
speed than consumption, there is substantial wealth decumulation after age










































Figure 7: Age-profile of wealth/consumption
Age: years
 No demographics  With demographics







When I add the cohort polynomial to the specification in Table 2 (with
restricted time dummies), I cannot reject the hypothesis of absence of cohort
effects in the wealth-consumption ratio (the F-test statistic is 2.12, which
given 5 and 39,908 degrees of freedom is not significant at the 5 percent
level). A proper test of the life-cycle hypothesis, however, is to confront a
model with unrestricted age, cohort and time effects against an alternative
including only the age polynomial and restricted time dummies (constrained
to sum to zero and to be orthogonal to a time trend, as explained in Section
3). In the basic specification, this test yields an F-statistic of 5.39, which is
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level given 7 and 39,908
degrees of freedom. Thus, the restrictions implied by the life-cycle model
are rejected on statistical grounds. However, this test is very demanding.
Given the large sample size, the flexible parametrization of cohort effects
and the particular form of the life-cycle model that is fully consistent with
both sets of identification assumptions, one would perhaps be surprised not
to reject the null hypothesis.24
It is useful at this stage to compare the age-wealth profiles obtained
under the two identifying assumptions, i.e. unrestricted cohort effects and
constrained time effects in the regressions for lnW and equality of cohort
effects in consumption and wealth and unrestricted time effects in the
regressions for ln(W/C). The bottom panel of Table 2 displays the average
annual rates of wealth accumulation for younger households (age 25-40),
the middle-aged (41-60), the old (61-70) and the very old (age 71-83)
implied by the regressions of Table 2. The rates of growth of wealth are also
plotted in Figure 8. In the case of the regressions for ln(W/C) the numbers
can be interpreted as average wealth growth rates only if one makes the
strong assumption that consumption is constant over the life-cycle, so that
the g(a) polynomial in equation (3) equals the s(a) polynomial in equation
(4).
Figure 8: Growth rate of wealth
 
 Specification in levels  Specification in ratios







The main difference between the two profiles is in the earlier part of the
life cycle. In fact, the regressions for the log of wealth predict higher
accumulation for younger households, especially up to age 40. But the
similarity between the two profiles are more striking, also considering that
the estimated age-profile for ln(W/C) truly reflects the growth of the wealth-25
consumption ratio, rather than of wealth alone: both indicate dissaving after
60, and substantial decumulation rates between age 70 and 83 (an average of
6 percent per year).
21 If demographic variables are introduced in the
regressions, the growth rate of wealth is uniformly higher for the level
specification. But even in this case, most of the difference between age
effects is for younger households. In sum, the equality of the two
specifications is rejected on statistical grounds, but both models explain
wealth accumulation reasonably well, and the predictions of the alternative
identification assumptions for the age-wealth profile are similar. Indeed, the
correlation coefficient between the growth rates of wealth in Figure 8 is 95.1
percent (97.1 percent including demographic controls).
7. Summary and implications
The pattern of wealth accumulation of Italian households conforms
reasonably well with the predictions of the life-cycle model. Most wealth
accumulation is done by the young and the middle-aged; the wealth profile
flattens between age 60 and 70; the average annual decumulation rates in
old age are between 3 and 6 percent, as predicted by many simulations of
life-cycle models without bequest motives.
22 Even if rejected by a statistical
test, the estimated age-wealth profile is quite similar under two very
different identification assumptions, i.e. the that all trends in wealth are
explained either by age or cohort effects, or that cohort effects in wealth and
consumption are equal.
The cohort effect in the regressions for the (log) of wealth increases
almost linearly with year of birth for the generations born between 1910 and
1950; for younger generations the cohort effect declines considerably. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that these dummies capture the effect of
generation-specific productivity growth. If the young save and the old
dissave (as in Figure 8), and if the differences in the resources that belong to
each generation reflect cohort-specific productivity growth, rather than
21 The median decumulation rates do not differ much from the averages and are not reported for
brevity.
22 These rates also broadly confirm the findings with panel data for the U.S. by Diamond and
Hausman (1984) and Hurd (1987) and by Brugiavini (1987) with the 1984 SHIW.26
attitudes towards bequests, the aggregation mechanism of the life-cycle
model leads to a positive relation between growth and saving. However, it
would be premature to draw such a strong conclusion from the results.
First of all, a relatively small number of wealthy households and
households with higher educational attainment show no tendency to
decumulate wealth during retirement. This implies that one cannot predict
the aggregate saving rate from the behavior of the average household. Even
if the absolute number of wealthy households is not large, the rich control a
substantial share of aggregate wealth. For instance, 8 percent of college-
educated households controls 18 percent of aggregate wealth, and the richest
5 percent in the sample controls over 30 percent. Understanding the
behavior of these households becomes crucial for an understanding of the
saving-growth link.
Second, decumulation during retirement implies absence of a bequest
motive only if gifts are not a major component of households’ wealth. If
most transfers occur inter vivos one would also observe wealth
decumulation in old age, but the implication for the aggregate saving rate
would be rather different than the predictions of the life-cycle model.
Available empirical evidence for the Italian economy suggests that this is
not the case, but more evidence on the exact timing and amount of inter
vivos transfers is clearly needed.
Finally, annuities have a potential strong impact on asset accumulation. If
pension wealth is considered as part of dissaving during retirement,
decumulation of total wealth in old age would be even greater than what
found in the data. But measuring this impact is not easy, because it requires
an estimate of pension wealth (including social security) and of the degree
of substitution between private and pension wealth.
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Appendix
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) was
conducted on a yearly basis from 1965 to 1987 (with the exception of 1985).
Up to 1984 the number of participant households in a typical year was
around 4,000. In 1986 the sample size was doubled, and since 1987 the
survey has been run every other year. The most recent available survey is
for 1993.
The survey is representative of the Italian population because probability
selection is enforced at every stage of sampling. The unit of observation is
the family, which is defined to include all persons residing in the same
dwelling who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. Individuals
selected as "partners or other common-law relationships" are also treated as
families. Persons living in institutions (e.g., nursing homes, military
installations) are not included. The household head is defined to be the
husband, if present.
The interviews are conducted during the first three months of the year;
thus flow variables refer to the previous calendar year, and stock variables
are end-of period values. The use of sample weights is recommended,
particularly for 1987, a year in which the survey over-sampled wealthy
households (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994). All statistics reported in this
paper use sample weights.
Before 1980 the survey is not available on tape. Up to 1983 the age
variable, which is central to the present analysis, is coded in 10-year bands,
with an open interval for individuals over 65 years of age. Since this
precludes the construction of the cohort indicators, we are forced to use
1984 as the starting point for the analysis. The data set includes the 1984,
1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 SHIW, a total of 44,792 observations. The
same definitions of demographic and economic variables are used in the 630
cross-sections. Wealth and consumption are converted into 1991 lire using
the CPI deflator.
23
Net worth is the sum of household's financial assets and net real assets.
The latter comprise real estate and unincorporated business holdings less
household liabilities (consumer credit and mortgage loans). Data on
financial assets were not collected in 1984 and 1986; since then, they have
been collected but not released to outside users.
We impute financial wealth by scaling up the flow of financial income,
the sum of interest on checking accounts, savings accounts, money market
accounts, certificates of deposit, government bonds and corporate bonds
plus dividends. Separate figures for these items are not available. An
average after-tax interest rate is accordingly constructed by weighting the
after-tax interest rates for currency, deposits, government bonds and other
financial assets by their respective shares in the financial accounts data. This
procedure controls for the substantial portfolio shift of Italian households
away from checking and saving accounts to government bonds of various
maturities as well as for the frequent changes in the taxation of capital
income during the eighties.
24
The imputation procedure may introduce measurement error in total
wealth. For instance, it does not reflect capital gains. Since the life-cycle
model is concerned with planned asset acquisition or depletion, and to the
extent that capital gains are largely unexpected, this omission may actually
be desirable for the problem at hand.
Information on financial income is missing for 26 percent of the sample;
rather than wasting so many data points, missing data for financial income
are imputed using the estimated coefficients of a regression that takes into
account the probability of non-responses. The probit model for non-
responses includes age, education, sector and occupation dummies, regional
and year dummies. The equation for financial income includes age,
occupation dummies, regional and year dummies and the selectivity
23  The values used for conversion into 1991 lire are 1.53 for 1984, 1.33 for 1986, 1.27 for 1987, 1.13
for 1989 and 0.91 for 1993.
24  The estimated after-tax interest rates are: 11.01 percent in 1984, 8.32 percent in 1986, 7.47
percent in 1987, 8.28 percent in 1989, 8.15 percent in 1991 and 7.52 in 1993.31
variable.
25 In the row data average financial income is 1.891 million lire;
average imputed financial income equals 2.394 million lire.
Table A1 compares the SHIW measures of wealth and income with the
aggregate national accounts. Column (1) reports the raw aggregate data; in
column (2) these are divided by an estimate of the number of households.
Column (3) reports the average SHIW data, and column (4) the ratio of the
SHIW to the national data: the further away this indicator is from unity, the
greater the under-estimation of the microeconomic data.
It is clear that the SHIW underestimates substantially the aggregate data.
In particular, disposable income is underestimated by about 20 percent.
Brandolini and Cannari (1994) compare the aggregate data with the 1989
SHIW and find that the difference between the aggregate and SHIW
measures of disposable income arises mainly from self-employment income
(underestimated by half), pension benefits (by a third) and financial income.
The figures for rents and transfers are consistent, and wages and salaries
slightly overestimated with respect to the national accounts data.
Net worth is underestimated by about 35 percent. The bias is only about
20 percent for real assets. In fact, the number of owner-occupied dwellings
in the SHIW is close to the aggregate, but "the estimated number of houses
owned by households for purposes other than owner-occupation is
appreciably lower than that recorded in the 1981 Census, especially holiday
homes" (Cannari and D'Alessio, 1990).
The SHIW and aggregate data on financial assets differ substantially.
Most of the SHIW underestimation involves corporate bonds, shares,
investment funds units, insurance, private pensions and foreign assets. The
difference is mainly due to under-reporting by wealthy households, who
own a disproportionate share of the more sophisticated financial
instruments. However, it is also partly explained by the fact that the value of
insurance policies and severance pay, which accounted for roughly 10
percent of financial assets in the second half of the eighties, is not included
in the SHIW data. Excluding insurance and severance pay would therefore
increase the ratio of SHIW to aggregate data from the value of 35-40
percent in column (4) to 45-50 percent. Even making this adjustment, the
25  For brevity these results are not reported but are available upon request.32
SHIW underestimates financial wealth more markedly than do comparable
surveys for Canada, the United States and Japan.
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TABLE A1














1984 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Disposable income 837 43.8 34.4 0.79
Real assets 3,104 162.5 128.9 0.79
Net financial wealth 1,040 54.4 18.1 0.33
Net worth 4,144 217.0 147.0 0.68
1986
Disposable income 872 45.7 32.6 0.71
Real assets 2,982 156.2 115.3 0.74
Net financial wealth 1,393 72.9 27.9 0.38
Net worth 4,375 229.1 143.2 0.63
1987
Disposable income 914 47.9 38.0 0.79
Real assets 3,256 170.5 126.6 0.74
Net financial wealth 1,497 78.4 27.3 0.35
Net worth 4,753 248.9 153.9 0.61
1989
Disposable income 971 50.8 40.9 0.81
Real assets 3,386 177.3 148.2 0.83
Net financial wealth 1,504 78.8 31.1 0.39
Net worth 5,054 264.6 179.3 0.68
1991
Disposable income 1,003 52.5 37.6 0.72
Real assets 3,499 183.2 166.6 0.90
Net financial assets 1,554 81.4 34.3 0.42
Net worth 5,222 273.4 200.9 0.73
1993
Disposable income -.- -.- 36.0 -.-
Real assets -.- -.- 190.5 -.-
Net financial assets -.- -.- 29.7 -.-
Net worth -.- -.- 220.2 -.-
Notes: All data are converted in 1991 lire. The aggregate data in column (1) are end-of-
period values drawn from Pagliano and Rossi (1992), Tables 20 and 21. 1993 values are our
own estimates based on the 1993 Annual Report of the Bank of Italy. The data in column
(2) are obtained dividing the aggregate values by 19.1 million, an estimate of the number of
households. The SHIW averages in column (3) are computed using sample weights and are
based on the entire data set for each survey.